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At an
economic outlook seminar
presented in Kalispell on June 3, Maxine
Johnson discussed the current outlook for
the state economy. This article is based on
that presentation.

N o t long ago, a writer on the editorial page of The
suggested that a freeze be
imposed on economic forecasting. No more
economic projections or forecasts should be
permitted. The writer stated that economists could
then be freed for more productive work, and he
cited shortages of labor in appliance repair,
plumbing, police protection, and garbage collec
tion.
Some economists, he noted, might insist on
continuing in their chosen professions, but he had
a recommendation as to how to keep them from
making forecasts. It's easy, he said. Congress could
simply pass a law that any economist caught
forecasting would be forced to recite, in public, all
his or her earlier forecasts.
My evaluation of the prospects for the Montana
economy during the decade of the eighties has not
changed since it appeared in the Spring 1980 issue
of the Q u a rte rly . I am, however, much more
pessimistic about this year than I was a few months
ago.
The current recession may have begun in
Montana late in 1979. Preliminary estimates from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, released in
early May, indicate that both total personal income
and per capita income declined slightly last year,
after adjustment for inflation. Each estimate, when
put into 1972 dollars, is one percent below the 1978
figure.
At the present time, there is no consensus among
economists as to how severe the recession will be,
or how long it will last. Each time new economic
data are released, the view with respect to the
downturn becomes more gloomy. However, as of
late May, the following assumptions were fre
quently used by forecasters at the national level:
W a ll S tre e t J o u rn a l

ECONOMIC UPDATE:
MONTANA’S OUTLOOK
AT MIDYEAR
MAXINE C. JOHNSON

,
,
, .
,
, .
, ,
.
, ,

,
,

1980 inflation rate near 10 percent.
Decline in U.S. economic activity during first
three quarters, recovery beginning in
fourth quarter.
Gross national product from 2 to 3 percent
below 1979, after adjustment for inflation.
Maximum of one million new housing starts.
5

The inflation rate used here refers to the implicit
price deflator for the gross national product. The
consumer price index, which is more frequently
quoted in the press, is often higher than the
deflator and might average as much as 12 percent
over 1979 this year.
The two most crucial matters for the Montana
economy this year are the condition of the U. S.
housing market and state agricultural output and
prices. Markets for western Montana's forest
industry output—lumber, plywood and board
products—are heavily dependent upon the hous
ing industry. In eastern Montana, agriculture
continues to be the leading source of income and is
of overwhelming importance in many areas.
Everyone knows the U. S. housing market is in
trouble, and that means western Montana also has
problems. Most current projections now foresee
around 1.0 million new housing starts in the
country this year. That figure may be compared to
the 2.0 million starts in 1978 and the 1.7 million last
year. It would make 1980 a worse year for housing
than 1975, when almost 1.2 million units were
started. According to the U. S. Department of
Commerce, there was over a 10 months' supply of
new houses unsold in the United States at the end
of March. That was the largest inventory since the
Department began keeping records seventeen
years ago.
As a result of the disastrous housing market,
things have been grim in western Montana for the
last few months. At one point, almost 4,000 wood
products industry workers were unemployed.
Some now have gone back to work on a temporary
basis. Nevertheless, the immediate outlook is not
very encouraging. If the paper market declines and
the demand for chips falls, things will get worse.
The interest rate on mortgages is falling and may
go lower, but the current large supply of unsold
housing plus the recession probably mean a slow
recovery in homebuilding. Data Resources, Inc.
projects a total of about 1.5 million housing starts in
1981, working up to 1.9 million units in 1982. It may
be next spring before the forest industries in
western Montana feel the effects of the upturn and
even then, 1.5 million new housing starts in 1981
would mean only an average year.
In the past, agriculture has sometimes served as a
bulwark against recession in eastern Montana. That
appears not to be happening this year. Cash
receipts from farm marketings (including govern
ment payments) declined in 1979, and real net farm
income was down considerably, mostly because of
a smaller grain crop. Wheat prices this spring are
6

higher than they were last fall, but the crop may
again be below average in size, because of slightly
reduced acreage and the lack of rain in eastern
Montana. Cattle prices currently are lower than
they were a year ago. Dry weather and poor range
conditions forced some ranchers to sell off part of
their herds. Total cash receipts in 1980 may be lower
than in 1979. With farm production costs rising
rapidly, net income is likely to fall again.
Other industries which are important to Mon
tana because they export goods and services, or
otherwise bring money into the state, have mixed
prospects for the next few months.

“ I am much more pessimistic
about this year than I was a
few months ago.”
There is some good news. Oil and gas exploration
activity continues at a good pace, benefiting the
eastern part of the state especially, but also the
Overthrust Belt area in western Montana. Coal
production may increase somewhat, although
some consumers of Montana coal are cutting back
orders as a result of the recession. Colstrip 3 and 4
should keep total heavy construction activity at
reasonably high levels. There currently are around
600 workers employed on those projects and the
number will increase during the year. All this will
help eastern Montana, especially the Billings area.
On the other hand, employment figures reflect
the cutback in mining and smelting employees by
The Anaconda Company, announced in January.
Those cuts were attributed to increased efficiency,
not to a decline in production. Since then, copper
prices have slipped because of declining demand
by the housing, appliance, and automobile in
dustries. That could mean further layoffs if output
in the Butte area is reduced. The Anaconda
aluminum plant at Columbia Falls, which employs
about 1,300 workers, faces better prospects; any
layoffs there are likely to be limited.
Montana's tourist industry, especially important
in western Montana, suffered from a decline in
travelers last year; some further decrease may
occur in 1980. A national recession plus high gas
prices probably mean fewer out-of-state visitors.
Efforts to attract people from nearby areas and to
persuade more Montanans to vacation in the state
may help. Visitors who do come may stay longer in
one place.
Federal government employment in March was
down substantially from March 1979; if the decline
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Table 1
Estimates of Labor Income
and Total Personal Income in Montana,
1978-1980
Hi 11Io n s o f 1972 D o lla r s
1978
1979
1980

- P e rc e n t Change 1979-79
1979-90

T o ta l Labor Income

2 ,5 * *

2 ,* 4 6

2,310

-4

-9

T o ta l Personal Income

3,8 1 7

3,5 7 0

3 ,*9 0

-1

-9

Sources: 1978 and 1979 — U. S . Bureau o f Economic A n a ly s is ; 1980 — Bureau o f
Business and Economic R esearch, U n iv e r s ity o f Montana.
Note: Income fig u r e s d e fla te d b y th e i m p l i c i t p r ic e d e f la t o r f o r p ersonal
consum ption e x p e n d itu re s .

continues, the total earnings of federal employees
also will decrease this year. With the layoffs by the
Milwaukee Road and the nationwide recession,
railroads are not likely to provide increased
employment or earnings this year.
Given these prospects for Montana's basic or
export industries, plus high inflation rates which
cut into the purchasing power of consumers, it is
clear that a good many retail firms and other
businesses may experience declines in their activity
this year. One indicator of how things are: although
employment in retail and wholesale trade in
creased modestly over last year's severe winter, the

j

S Z

M O N T A N A BUSINESS QUARTERLY/Summ er 1980

average number of hours worked per employee in
February and March was about 7 percent lower
than during the same months last year.
Keeping all this in mind, I would expect total real
labor income or earnings in Montana this year to
decline, by as much as 6 percent (table 1). But there
are two other components of total personal
income: property income (rent, dividends, and
interest) and transfer payments. Property income
may increase slightly and transfer payments likely
will grow significantly. Payments such as un
employment insurance are designed to increase
during periods of recession, and they will do so.
Social security payments are scheduled to go up on
July 1. As a result, total personal income, after
adjustment for inflation, may only decline by about
2 percent. Because our population is growing, real
per capita income (average income per person
after adjustment for inflation) will decline more
than 2 percent.
For many individuals and businesses, 1980 will be
a painful year. Conditions will vary from one area to
another, and from one industry to another. Eastern
Montana will fare better than the western part of
the state, although it may feel this recession more
than some earlier ones. Nevertheless, I remain
convinced that better times are ahead for Montana
in the 1980s.
□
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HEIKO DE B. WIJNHOLDS
D ire c t export marketing of grain is a topic which
has received considerable attention in the last
several years. Growing wheat surpluses, rising
costs, lower prices, and more competitive foreign
markets have led producers to consider alternative
channels of distribution. Producer pools is one
such alternative.
The North Dakota Wheat Pool was established as
an experimental venture in January 1976 with the
aim to undertake the export marketing of identitypreserved North Dakota wheat directly to foreign
buyers. The idea was to preserve the identity,
quality, and image of North Dakota wheat on the
one hand and eliminate reselling middlemen on
the other. However, the Pool confronted a number
of handicaps, and it ceased operation in August
1977. What follows is an examination of the Pool's
operation and why it was unsuccessful.
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The International Setting
During the period of the North Dakota Wheat
Pool's existence there was real concern among
wheat producers about falling prices and growing
surpluses. This was one of the major reasons for the
Pool's formation. At present (May 1980) there is
similar concern—this time galvanized by the
imposition of the grain embargo against the Soviet
Union.
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The grain embargo has both short-run im
plications for U.S. grain exporters and possible
long-run effects. Countries such as the Soviet
Union, the People's Republic of China (mainland
China), and even Japan may feel that they are or
have been too dependent on the United States and

its foreign policies. Hence they may wish to
diversify their suppliers. From the standpoint of
other nations, the reliability of the United States as a
major foodstuff supplier may be at stake. And, with
it, the viability of U.S. export operations and the
farmer's income.
The current situation raises several questions.
What role will U.S. multinational corporations play
in actively promoting U.S. grain exports? To what
extent are our main competitors (other grainproducing nations and foreign grain distributors)
going to benefit from the gap left by the United
States? How will U.S. distributor cooperatives and
farmers respond? Will this make direct export
marketing more feasible or politically more pop
ular? These considerations and related inter
national and political developments, such as oil
prices and inflation, pose a serious challenge to U.S.
grain exporters.
In this context the role of alternative channels of
distribution for U.S.wheat exports may have to be
reevaluated. At the very least, strategies will have to
be devised by all concerned to ensure that the
United States remains a major and dependable
exporter of wheat. The alternatives, growing
surpluses, lower production, more support, or
lower prices seem unacceptable from both an
economic and a political viewpoint.

Agricultural Marketing
The marketing of wheat and other agricultural
products differs from the procedures used for
manufactured products. The international market
structure, in particular, may appear to be complex if
not confusing. In addition to the marketing of the
actual product, in this case wheat, there are markets
for facilitating various additional services, such as
the transportation, storage, handling, and finan
cing of the grain. The North Dakota Wheat Pool was
only concerned with the actual buying and selling
of the wheat.
There are three methods usually used to
purchase agricultural products on the international
market. The public tender system is the procedure
used by foreign governments to invite sellers to
offer for sale specified quantities and qualities of a
particular commodity. The private tender system is
similar, only the buyer is a private concern rather
than a government agency. In the open market
system, direct negotiations are made between
buyers and sellers. The North Dakota Wheat Pool
was involved in each type of international
marketing method.
M O N T A N A BUSINESS QUARTERLY/Summer 1980

The North Dakota Experiment
Background
Cooperative agricultural ventures are a long
standing tradition in North Dakota. The Nonpar
tisan League, founded there before World War I,
actively opposed railroads and other large cor
porate interests. League members, mostly farmers,
felt that the freight rates charged to transport their
grain to out-of-state mills were excessive, and that
privately-owned banks discriminated against small
farmers. The League advocated instead a program
of state-owned banks, grain elevators, packing
plants, and marketing facilities. Two state-owned
institutions founded during this period, the North
Dakota State M ill and Elevator and the Bank of
North Dakota, still exist, and were used to aid the
North Dakota Wheat Pool in its operation. Farmers
in other Great Plains states and the Midwest also
had cooperative marketing ventures during the
early part of the century, but North Dakota is
unique in that the state-owned institutions from
the earlier era remain.

Organization
The founders of the North Dakota Wheat Pool
hoped to obtain better net prices for farmers
through direct marketing efforts to foreign buyers.
Farmers made voluntary wheat commitments in
terms of volume; each committed a specified
number of bushels to the Pool. Pool members
elected a steering committee, which oversaw the
Pool's activities.
The Pool delegated the responsibilities of wheat
storage and handling to private companies. The
Pool's broker facilitated the general marketing
transactions. Nonprofit organizations such as the
North Dakota State Wheat Commission, Great
Plains Wheat Inc., and Western Wheat Associates
provided prom otional and inform ational
assistance. Administrative and some marketing
tasks were undertaken by representatives of North
Dakota State M ill and Elevator. This agency
sometimes made direct contact with buyers.
The wheat offered by the Pool was hard red
spring wheat and durum. These two types are also
available from other states, but, obviously, the
emphasis here was on the wheat's North Dakota
origin.

Customers
Although the United States exports wheat to almost
every major region of the world, the efforts of the
9

North Dakota Wheat Pool were concentrated
mainly on countries in North Africa, Western
Europe, and to some extent the Middle East and
Asia. The Pool had to operate under certain
constraints. For instance, the Pool could not sell to
resellers, and the wheat purchased by the buyer
had to be used for human consumption or for
storage. It was difficult for the Pool to sell grain
under government tender, as the wheat classes
available were usually not of the exact specified
quality desired for the tenders. Nevertheless, a sale
was made to Tunisia under the Food For Peace
Program, the first durum sale under this program.
Originally it was also the intention of the pool to
approach mainly the small buyers of wheat, as their
needs would be limited and thus more attuned to
the limited supply that the Pool had to offer.
Unfortunately certain problems arose that
necessitated contacts with larger buyers in some
instances. Most of the smaller buyers had to
contend with a lack of available storage space.
Another problem was the cost of holding inven
tories for any period of time. For such buyers it was
more advantageous to buy from larger trading
corporations which could fulfill all these functions
and had the required facilities.
As far as large buyers were concerned, their
needs were usually substantial, and even if the Pool
could provide their needs for a certain period of
time, it could not do so on a continuous basis. Most
of these buyers and even some of the smaller
buyers preferred an assured supply of wheat. This is
especially true where special wheat has been
10

offered for sale, as in the case of the North Dakota
classes.
Specific customer preferences posed certain
problems for the Pool, but at the same time also
presented certain opportunities. For instance, the
North Dakota wheat varieties are usually higher
priced because of higher quality, particularly in the
protein content of the wheat. Many buyers,
however, are very price-conscious and are not too
concerned with quality, which meant that those
buyers could not be enticed to purchase the more
expensive North Dakota wheat classes. Moreover,
the actual classes were not always suited to the
needs of the customer. North Dakota wheat could
not be blended with other kinds of wheat to
precisely fit the needs of some customers, since the
whole idea of the Pool was to sell identitypreserved wheat. Also, some buyers were looking
for a gluten content different from that found in the
North Dakota classes.
The advantage of the identity-preserved wheat
offered by the Pool was that some countries
preferred to buy wheat directly from the
producers. A case in point was Iraq, which prefers
to deal directly with farmer groups.

Competition
The North Dakota Wheat Pool encountered two
types of competition. The first was the competition
from other members of the same marketing
channel in which the Pool operated. This competi
tion was not direct, however, since most of the
other pools dealt with different types of identitypreserved wheat. Also, there were not many of
these pools in active operation during the North
Dakota Pool's existence. Generally speaking, these
pools have been neither very successful nor very
active recently.
The other type of competition was from more
traditional sources. These were the producers who
were represented by export companies both in the
United States and in other countries. Such concerns
included the multinational trading corporations,
farmer cooperatives, and government bodies such
as the Canadian Wheat Board. In addition there
were various intermediaries operating on behalf of
these organizations or institutions, for instance
brokers and agents. These organizations
represented the most severe competition facing
the Pool. It is evident that most of these competitors
enjoyed (and still enjoy) a wide range of advantages
over the pools, although the latter have, in turn,
some competitive strengths.

North Dakota Wheat Pool: What Went Wrong//-/e//co
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Marketing
As indicated earlier, the Poors marketing
operations were delegated to other organizations.
The result was a fragmented marketing picture,
which is understandable since the Pool chose to
have no marketing resources of its own. No
marketing expertise was available to the Pool on a
full-time basis.
Information. The Pool's broker and represen
tatives of the other nonprofit organizations
previously mentioned were the major sources of
marketing information. These individuals obtained
data concerning the nature of the tenders available
for bid, as well as information regarding finalized
transactions, actual bid prices, and the quality and
conditions of sales. Market prices as well as market
sizes for certain areas were also utilized by officials
representing the Pool. The information collected
was similar to but not as extensive as that regularly
obtained and utilized by multinational U.S. grain
exporters, and groups such as the Canadian Wheat
Board.
Since the Pool did not employ a marketing
specialist, it had no option but to call on outside
agencies, such as the North Dakota State Wheat
Commission and the others listed, for assistance.
Fortunately, the Pool's needs were not as
widespread or intensive as those of its larger
competitors. On the other hand, it faced unique
problems in attempting to identify smaller con
sumers who might be interested in identitypreserved wheat of superior quality, but higher
price.
Sales initiation. As indicated, one of the tasks of
the providers of the marketing information was to
identify representatives of potential buyers. The
Pool then followed up on this information. Also,
officials of the North Dakota State M ill participated
in a North Dakota trade mission to the Middle East,
where further contacts for the Pool were establish
ed.
Since the Pool was a unique concern with special
needs, Pool officials discovered various problems
during their negotiations with potential buyers.
The Pool attempted to organize several small
foreign mills into a buying cooperative. Such an
arrangement would have ensured a regular
demand for the pool's wheat. However, the pool
found that the limited amount of durum available
was insufficient to meet the demand of such a
cooperative. Consequently the arrangement fell
through.

Depending on market conditions, either the
wheat seller or buyer may initiate negotiations.
Because the pool was not well known and was
attempting to sell a unique product, those
representing it had to be especially energetic in
their marketing efforts. The extra effort compen
sated, to some extent, for the Pool's relatively
unknown position.
Promotion. Promotion of the Pool's wheat was
part of the general promotion campaigns under
taken by Great Plains Wheat Inc., Western Wheat
Associates, and their affiliates, such as the North
Dakota Wheat Commission. The operations of
these groups include many of the major efforts
made to promote the export marketing of U.S.
wheat in general. It is not possible to separate from
these marketing efforts those that directly
benefited the North Dakota Wheat Pool. However,
it may be useful to discuss the general promotional
activities undertaken.
Marketing groups such as these tend to
emphasize two types of promotional activities. The
first type consists of "macro" promotional ac
tivities, which are intended to benefit trade in
general. These would include promotion of
international trade policies which would create
favorable marketing conditions. The second type
consists of "m icro" or more specific managementoriented promotion operations. These include
direct promotional activities, consumer promo
tion, official contacts, and technical assistance.
Although some of these promotional operations
no doubt benefited the Pool, it is very difficult to
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ascertain to what extent. Here again, the Pool was at
a disadvantage in that these promotional activities
are usually not geared to the promotion of identitypreserved wheat. On the other hand, the Pool did
benefit from the same expertise that is also utilized
by the multinational grain trading companies.
Canada enjoys a more centralized promotional
effort through the activities of the Canadian
International Grain Institute. If a substantial
amount of identity-preserved wheat were available
for marketing, it is conceivable that marketing
groups such as those described here could mount
successful specific promotional campaigns.
Price. As a result of the relatively high quality and
higher price of the Pool's wheat, some segments of
the market were not utilized. Large-volume
programs, such as the Food For Peace Program,
which required large volume and low price, were
not interested in the Pool's wheat, other than the
durum purchase mentioned earlier.
The Pool's wheat prices were determined on the
futures market. While no advance payment was
required, no outstanding debts remained at the
completion of the Pool's period of active opera
tion. Payments were made in U.S. dollars to the
Bank of North Dakota, a state bank. Sales were
f.o.b., which meant that no price figuring was
necessary for insurance or foreign transportation.
It appears that the overall average price obtained
for Pool wheat was comparable to the prevailing
market price. An issue of crucial importance in
determining the Pool's effectiveness is whether the
Pool realized a higher net return for its farmers than
they would have obtained through alternative
marketing channels. While the experience of this
limited experiment is not conclusive, the Pool's net
return was somewhat lower. A true test of the Pool's
effectiveness would have occurred if the time
period of its operation had been extended, the
volume of wheat available to it had been substan
tially increased, and perhaps more classes of wheat
had been made available.
Distribution. The Pool owned no distribution
facilities, and rented them from private companies.
The Pool directed the flow of wheat from farmer to
elevator, or directly from the farmer to a terminal at
Duluth, Minnesota. All Pool wheat was shipped
from Duluth, and the Pool rented storage facilities
there from a private concern.
Storage costs were relatively high, due in part to
the low volume of wheat handled and because
special storage arrangements had to be made to
preserve the high quality wheat. Foreign logistics,
as stated earlier, were not the Pool's concern.

However, this also adversely affected sales, since
some potential foreign buyers did not have
adequate storage facilities. It appears that com
panies and cooperatives owning their own facilities
had a distinct advantage over the Pool.
Customer service. Since the Pool's marketing
operations were handled by the nonprofit
promotional institutions mentioned earlier, the
services offered to its customers were identical to
those offered by all U.S. wheat exporters. These
included general consumer education, assistance
in understanding the U.S. wheat handling and
grading system, and reports on the wheat's quality
characteristics. Also offered was specific technical
assistance, including technical and marketing
consultants and formal training facilities.

Conclusions
The North Dakota Wheat Pool ceased active
operation in August 1977. The steering committee
remains, but currently there are no plans for the
Pool to become operational again.
The Pool faced a number of handicaps during its
existence, many of which have already been
mentioned. These include the limited price range
which resulted from the high quality wheat classes
offered for sale, the impossibility of obtaining
compensating higher margins on the lease of
facilities, freight cost disadvantages, and relatively
higher administrative, storage, and handling costs.
Many of the drawbacks of this system stemmed
from the identity-preserved character of the
product offered by the Pool. Buyers did express
interest in the quality of the wheat, and were, in a
number of instances, highly complimentary.
However, a number of market segments could not
be satisfied because the wheat had to be identitypreserved.
One of the problems was that durum grown in
the United States generally is not of the precise
gluten strength that many buyers desire. Much
North Dakota durum is of especially high gluten
strength. As a result these buyers tend to prefer
durum from Argentina and Canada. This made
marketing difficult for the Pool, since durum was
one of its two major products.
The Pool's competitors enjoyed several advan
tages. Most could utilize wheat of multiple origin,
that is, they utilized wheat from other states or
countries, blending to satisfy their customers'
needs. The Pool, by its nature, could not do this.
Identity-preserved wheat requires special ship
ping and handling. The Pool's wheat could not be
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blended with other varieties for transporting and
storage. Also, the relatively low volume of wheat
marketed meant that per-unit shipping and storage
costs were higher.
The lack of a sizable supply of wheat available to
the Pool was a fundamental handicap. Large buyers
could not be assured of sufficient quantities to suit

channel until the scope of such an operation has
been expanded.

“ There has been little emphasis
in Montana on the marketing of
identity-preserved wheat.”
their needs. Also, since the Pool was experimental,
no guarantees could be made to buyers regarding
future delivery. Long-term contracts could not be
negotiated.
As was pointed out earlier, the Pool also suffered
because it offered no supplementary marketing
functions. Its storage facilities were rented, thus
increasing costs. Smaller buyers, with no storage or
distribution facilities, could not be accommodated.
Finally, the Pool did not have its own marketing
staff. It relied on the assistance of personnel from
other institutions. These people all had additional
duties and could not devote a majority of their time
solely to the Pool's unique marketing problems.
The Pool did enjoy some advantages. The more
direct marketing concept did enable it, in theory at
least, to be in closer contact with the consumer.
Some buyers, especially some foreign
governments, prefer to deal directly with farmer
groups. The fact that the Pool's wheat was identitypreserved meant that the wheat required special
handling. Therefore, there was less chance of the
wheat's quality deteriorating while in transit.
As a result of the North Dakota Wheat Pool
experience, the North Dakota Department of
Agriculture reexamined the marketing strategies
utilized by groups such as North Dakota State M ill
and Elevator. The high transportation costs borne
by the Pool pointed out the need for a concerted
effort to reduce freight rates. The state is currently
planning a system of grain sub-terminals, similar to
the system being studied in Montana.
One objective of the Pool was to obtain for its
members a higher net price. However, during the
time of the operation, those producers who
participated received a lower net price than those
operating through more traditional marketing
channels. The Pool's operations were limited. No
final judgment can be passed on the viability of a
wheat pool as an alternative export marketing
. M O N T A N A BUSINESS QUARTERLY/Summer 1980

The Montana Situation
During the first half of the century, Montana, like
North Dakota, was the home of several
organizations which advocated cooperative
agricultural marketing efforts. The Nonpartisan
League had a strong following in the eastern part of
the state, particularly during the drought which
swept the Great Plains beginning in 1917. However,
the League's influence dissipated in Montana due
to a number of factors. Many of Montana's farmers
simply left the state during those hard years. Also,
the League's focus in Montana had been on
facilitating a more equitable system of taxation
rather than on state-owned banks and mills.
Montana, therefore, never had the state-owned
facilities which were instrumental in the North
Dakota Wheat Pool venture.
There has been little emphasis in Montana on the
marketing of identity-preserved wheat. The state's
growers produce numerous classes of wheat (hard
red winter, dark northern spring, soft white, and
some durum), whereas many North Dakota farmers
produce large quantities of hard red spring wheat.
This wheat is of exceptionally high quality (it is
considered to be the "Cadillac of wheat"), and is
perhaps more suitable for identity-preserved
marketing. Also, Montana's large land mass makes
transportation of any product especially expensive;
the additional costs incurred due to identitypreservation would be prohibitive.
Currently,
M ontana's
Department of
Agriculture, like its North Dakota counterpart, is
attempting to aid wheat producers by designing a
system of grain sub-terminals. This system would
include centralized collection points and storage
facilities. The railroads' unit trains would need to
make fewer stops to load Montana grain, which
would lower the total costs of transportation.
Another aid to the Montana wheat grower is the
newly-formed U.S. Wheat Associates, which was
established in January 1980 through the merger of
Great Plains Wheat Inc. and Western Wheat
Associates. Montana had been a member of
Western Wheat Associates since 1969. The new
organization represents thirteen U.S. wheat
producing states, and is funded by them. Through
this organization and the proposed system of grain
sub-terminals, both North Dakota and Montana are
attempting to help wheat farmers increase their net
return.
E
13

POPULATION
AGE
STRUCTURE:
AN UPDATE
PAUL E. POLZIN

Paul Polzin included the following discus
sion in this year's series of economic
outlook seminars.

Several years ago I talked about the principles of
age structure analysis and discussed some of its
implications for Montana. This turned out to be a
very popular topic. I would like to return to this
topic, present some of the updated figures, and
once again discuss future demographic trends.
Before looking at the new figures, it may be
helpful to review some of the principles of age
structure analysis. The underlying technique is very
simple; the population at a future time consists
mostly of persons already alive, except that they will
be five, ten, or twenty years older. For example, as
shown in figure 1, based on standard mortality
tables, a group of 1,000 thirty-five year olds in 1980
will yield about 987 forty-year olds in 1985, and 967
forty-five year olds in 1990.
Montana's population will be used to illustrate
some of the other features of age structure analysis.
Figure 2 shows the age distribution of Montana
residents as reported in the 1970 Census. The most
striking feature of this graph—and the aspect to
which we will return again and again—is the
"bulge" in the number of persons aged five to
twenty-four years old. This is the "postwar baby
crop." There is some disagreement among the
experts as to the exact beginning and end of this
phenomenon; for our purposes, we will include all
persons born between 1946 and 1964. Using this
14
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definition, the postwar baby crop in Montana
consisted of 273,000 persons aged five to twentyfour years old in 1970. This compares to a total
population of 684,409 that year. In other words, the
postwar baby crop accounted for approximately 39
percent of Montana’s 1970 population. This age
group is an important segment of the state’s
population.
Looking at the data in figure 2, we can easily
identify some of the major events during the past
decades. Notice the plateau corresponding to the
thirty to fifty-nine year olds. Based only on average
life expectancies, we would expect relatively more
younger persons (thirty to forty-four year olds) than
older persons (forty-five to fifty-nine year olds) in
this group. But, the unsettled conditions in the late
twenties, the Great Depression, and World War II
all led to an unusually small number of births
between 1925 and 1940, which in turn resulted in
the relatively few persons in the thirty to forty-four

year old bracket in 1970. Beginning about 1946,
there was a sharp increase in births and the ensuing
baby boom continued for about twenty years.
Finally, recent concerns about family size, the
emphasis on contraception, and other events
during the middle and late sixties led to a sharp
decline in births and a corresponding decrease in
children less than nine years old during 1970.
Future age distributions may be estimated by
beginning with the 1970 population and applying
the mortality rates discussed earlier. Figure 3
illustrates the age distribution of Montana's
population during the year 2000. It pictures the
inevitable aging of the population; the bulge in the
population graph is now centered on the thirty-five
to fifty-four year olds, as compared to the five to
twenty-four year olds in 1970. In other words, in the
year 2000 the postwar baby crop will be middle
aged. Another interesting feature is the second
bulge of persons twenty-four years old and
younger. This corresponds to a projected increase
in births after 1975, and reflects the children of the
postwar baby crop. Even if each of today's couples
would have only two children, the increase in the
number of persons in the child-bearing age would
result in a rise in the number of births. Even though
the births per person stay the same, there will be a
sharp rise in the number of persons in the child
bearing age brackets.
When I first mentioned the possibility of an
increase in births several years ago, it was only a
projection. But the latest data suggest that it may
Figure 1
Estimated Five and Ten Year Survivors
for a Group of Thirty-Five Year Olds

Figure 2
Age Distribution of the Population
Montana, 1970

become a reality. The number of births in Montana
is shown in table 1. Notice that after reaching a
trough in 1975, the number of births has risen each
year. The estimate of 13,897 for 1979 is almost 15
percent above the 1975 figure, but still well below
the peak of 18,000 during 1957. Notice also that
there have been some minor ups and downs in the
figures. For example, there was a decline from 1967
to 1969—and then a minor upturn in 1970 and 1971,
and then a downturn in 1972 and 1973. So, even
though births have increased every year since 1975,
we still should be a little cautious about the second
baby boom.
We are not yet able to assess the size of the
second baby crop; it depends on the trend in the
fertility rate. If the current low birth rates continue,
or even decline further, the increase in births may

Figure 3
Projected Age Distribution of the Population
Assuming No Net Migration
Montana, 2000
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Table 1
Resident Births
Montana
1950 to 1979
1950—
1951 —
1952—
1953—
1954—

1 5 ,5 9 2
1 5 ,9 2 9
1 6 ,4 7 9
1 6 ,5 7 6
1 7 ,2 7 6

1960—
1961 —
1962—
1963—
1964—

1 7 ,4 4 8
1 7 ,3 6 8
1 6 ,8 1 8
1 5 ,9 3 4
1 5 ,0 9 6

1970—
1971 —
1972—
1973—
1974—

1 2 ,6 2 2
1 2 ,3 4 7
1 1 ,4 4 4
1 1 ,3 9 2
1 2 ,2 7 3

1955—
1956—
1957—
1958—
1959—

1 7 ,4 5 4
1 7 ,7 0 3
1 8 ,2 1 9
1 7 ,2 7 5
1 7 ,6 4 6

1965—
1966—
1967—
1968—
1969—

13,641
1 2 ,6 2 3
1 2 ,0 8 7
1 1 ,9 9 7
1 1 ,7 6 2

1975— 1 2 ,0 7 0
1976— 1 2 ,6 0 5
1977— 1 3 ,3 0 4
1 9 7 8 - 1 3 ,5 4 5
1979— 1 3 ,8 9 7 *

* P r e lim in a r y

only be a minor blip in the graph. On the other
hand, if the birth rate stops its decline, the second
bulge in the population graph may come close to
matching the first. And there are some good
reasons for believing that the birth rate may stop
declining. First of all, the current low birth rate may
reflect a postponement of births, rather than a
decision to have no children (and we won't know
this until those in the postwar baby crop complete
their child-bearing years). In addition, some
experts believe that the social trends causing low
fertility may have bottomed out. No one believes
that we will return to the high birth years of the
1950s, but there are good reasons to believe that the
birth rates will not decline indefinitely.

Housing patterns and “no growth”
Turning to a different topic, age structure analysis
provides some very useful insights into one of the
most explosive and controversial topics facing local
governments, the problems of mushrooming
subdivisions and the resulting attempts to legislate
Table 2
Homeowning Households Per One
Thousand Population, by Age Group
United States, 1975

Age o f Head
1 4 -2 4
2 5 -3 4
3 5 -4 4
4 5 -5 4
5 5 -6 4
65+
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H o u s e h o ld s P er
One Thousand
P o p u la t io n
133
449
674
757
760
691

"no growth." Beginning about 1970, people began
to worry about a proliferation in the number of
subdivisions and accompanying urban sprawl.
Many persons viewed the increased demand for
housing as being caused by new residents—
persons moving into a community from
somewhere else. As a result, some communities
attempted to halt the inmigration and adopted "no
growth" policies.
Unfortunately, the "no growth" policies were
misdirected. For the most part, new residents were
not responsible for this housing demand. Rather, it
was young adults, those born during the postwar
years who were growing up, moving out of their
parents' homes, and establishing their own
households. To get some idea of the magnitude of
the problem, imagine 100 households, each with a
teenage son or daughter. For convenience, let's say
there are fifty boys and fifty girls. They marry, and
form fifty new households. This represents a 50
percent increase in the demand for housing, with
absolutely no change in population.
We can also get an idea of what is in store for us in
the next few years. Table 2 shows the proportion of
homeowning households in each age bracket.
There are no statistics as to exactly what type of
homes they are, but typically, home owners live in
single family dwellings as opposed to apartments or
other multifamily dwellings. Notice that the home
ownership rate rises rapidly during the early family
formation years—from about 13 percent among the
very young to 45 percent for those in their twenties
and thirties. The real peak in home ownership is not
reached until very late in the family cycle; about 76
percent of those in their fifties and sixties owned
their own home in 1975.
These data indicate that the real housing boom—
at least for single family dwellings—is yet to come.
The oldest of the postwar baby crop—those born in
the late forties and early fifties—are about thirty.
They are just entering the prime years of home
ownership. The large numbers born in the late
fifties and sixties are just beginning to enter the
family formation years.
I think much of the concern about local
economic growth and the push for "no growth"
policies may be a misdirected reaction to the
postwar baby crop. Many of the indicators which
formerly measured economic growth are now
biased by the changing age structure. For example,
an increase in traffic does not necessarily mean
more people—just more cars and more drivers.
And this may be caused by the postwar baby crop
obtaining driver's licenses—rather than by new
Population Age Structure: An
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people moving in. Most communities here in
Montana have continued to experience net
inmigration during the 1970s, but at about the same
rate as during the 1960s. The real culprits making
the 1970s look different from the 1960s have been
the postwar baby crop and the changing age
structure of the population.
All of this does not mean that there aren't a few
communities scattered around the country which
have experienced significant inmigration, such as
Colorado Springs and San Jose. But, much of the
excitement about runaway growth is probably
unnecessary. For the most part, communities are
not growing any faster now than they did ten years
ago—it just seems that way because the postwar
baby crop has affected some of our traditional
measures of local economic growth.

Employment
The changing age structure of the population will
have impacts throughout the economy. For exam
ple, it will even affect the internal personnel and
hiring practices of large companies. One important
goal of personnel policies is to insure the continued
flow of talent into and upward within a company.
The small birth years will mean correspondingly
reduced college graduating classes, and increased
competition by corporate recruiters for a dwin
dling supply of talented persons. Some firms may
be tempted to reduce their hiring of young people.
This in turn may lead to a serious shortage of
qualified middle management persons fifteen or
twenty years from now.

k jL
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Table 3
Projected Population, by Age Croup
United States
1 9 7 0 -8 0
0- 4
5 -1 4
1 5 -2 4
2 5 -3 4
3 5 -4 4
4 5 -6 4
65 and o v e r
T o ta l

-5 .9
- 1 7 .1
1 6 .7
4 4 .0
1 3 .0
9 .5
2 5 .0
9 .3

P e r c e n t Charig e — -------1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 0
1 9 8 0 -9 0
1 8 .8
5 .9
-1 6 .7
1 3 .9
4 2 .3
1 0 .9
2 0 .0
9 .4

-5 .3
8 .3
5 .7
- 1 7 .1
1 0 .8
7 .8
6 .7
6 .6

On the other hand, many firms have taken
advantage of the recent oversupply of well-trained
college graduates and hired many of the postwar
baby crop. In a few years, the most talented and
ambitious will expect to advance into management
positions; there may not be enough to go around.
Firms will have to decide if they want to retain those
persons and perhaps create additional manage
ment jobs, or face the possibility that they may
leave in search of greater rewards and oppor
tunities.

Future trends
Table 3 shows the projected population, by age
group, for the United States. Even though there will
be some differences between Montana and the
United States, the general trends will be similar and
we can discuss the future age distribution with a
considerable degree of confidence.
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Age Groups: What to Expect in the Future
Infants (0-4 years old). Big items among this age
group are diapers, baby food, and nursery school.
This age group decreased in size during the
seventies (and caused a decrease in demand for
baby shampoo and baby powder, which were then
advertised for other uses.) Their number will rise
during the eighties and early nineties as a result of
the second baby boom.
School age children (5-14 years old). They are
concerned with junk food, clothing fads, and
teenage idols. After a sharp decline during the
seventies, this group is projected to increase
modestly through the eighties and nineties.
Young adults (15 to 24 years old). Many of these
individuals will be in college or at their first job, and
probably living away from home. The sharp rise
during the seventies will be followed by an equally
precipitous decline in the eighties. There will be
only modest growth between 1990 and 2000.
Young families (25-34 years old). They are at the
start of their careers, many have young children,
and may be in the market for a house or a larger
apartment. Rapid growth during the seventies will
be followed by a more modest rise in the eighties,
and a sharp decline in the nineties.
Mature families (35-44 years old). These are
people with established careers; the wife is likely to
be working, and there are children in school. This
age group is currently increasing moderately. Their
numbers will mushroom between 1980 and 1990,
and then grow more slowly from 1990 to 2000.
Middle age (45-64 years old). These are the years
of peak earnings (often with two wage earners).
They are the most affluent families as more wives
enter the labor market and the expensive child
raising years are past. This age group will increase
moderately throughout the latter portion of the
century.
Senior citizens (65 and over). These are persons in
retirement. They may travel, and often require
medical care. Due to social security, pensions, and
personal investments, this age group will be more
secure than in the past. Senior citizens will increase
rapidly in the seventies and eighties with a
moderate growth during the nineties. The postwar
baby crop will not begin to enter this age group
until after the year 2000.
□
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» bECOTOTIBTS'
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Economists' Notebook is a new column which will appear regularly in the Quarterly. Staff
members of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research are constantly coming across
lists of economic information which they find interesting. This column will offer them the
opportunity to pass some of the data or ideas on to our readers.
Table 1

Per Capita Taxes, 1978
N^ontanans paid an average of $817 per person in
state and local taxes in fiscal year 1978, according to
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Residents of twentythree states paid larger amounts; the average for all
fifty states was $888 (table 1).
To better measure the tax burden, taxes are
frequently related to personal income. Because
their per capita incomes are lower than in many
states, Montanans do not fare as well when this
comparison is made. In 1978, they paid $138 in state
and local taxes for every $1,000 in personal income,
compared to a national average of $128 per $1,000
income. Residents of only ten states paid a higher
proportion of their incomes in state and local taxes.
There should be some consolation for Montana
residents in knowing that their tax position vis-a-vis
other Americans has improved in the past ten years.
Between 1968 and 1978, state and local taxes per
$1,000 of personal income increased an average of
19 percent nationally, and just 14 percent in
Montana.

Dependence On Federal Funds
How dependent are state and local governments
in Montana on federal funds? More dependent
than governments in many other states. In fiscal
1978, total general revenue per capita in Montana
(excluding liquor store and insurance trust
revenues) amounted to $1,559. Of that amount, 30
percent came from the federal government, 52
percent from state and local taxes, and 18 percent
from charges such as fees and rents and from
investment income and special assessments (e.g.,
special improvement district revenues). Only one
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Table 2
Per Capita Amounts of General Revenue1
------- Montana — Amount

T o ta l general revenue p e r c a p ita
From fe d e ra l government
fro m s ta te and lo c a l sources
Taxes
Charges and m iscellaneous
revenue

S I . 559
,

•*093
817

P oraont
o f T o ta l

Average, 50 S tates
Amount

P o ro m t
o f T o ta l

100

S I.W 9

100

70

1»130

ii
78

«

888

«
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*0 .S . Bureau o f the Census, G o v tr m a n ta l Pitum oeo i n 187?-?$, GF78, Ho. 5 ,
February 1980.
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state, Vermont, obtained a higher proportion of its
general revenue from the federal government (32
percent); two other states, Arkansas and Mississip
pi, received the same proportion—30 percent—as
Montana.
The fifty states combined received just 22 percent
of their total general revenue from federal sources,
and raised more of their revenue from taxes (61
percent) (table 2).

How Montana Spends Its Money
Per capita expenditures by Montana state and
local governments amounted to $1,515 in fiscal
1978. Where did the money go?
Forty-two percent of total expenditures per
person went for education; another 17 percent
went for transportation, mostly for highways.
Montana state and local governments spent
substantially more per capita for both these services
than did their counterparts in other states.
In education, the difference occurred mostly in
expenditures for local schools. Only Alaska ex
ceeded Montana's per capita expenditure for
public elementary and secondary schools. Natural
resources and parks and governmental administra
tion also were more heavily funded in Montana.
On the other hand, Montana governments spent
considerably less per capita than most other states
for public welfare, health and hospitals, interest on
debt, and police services (table 3).

Per Capita Expenditures by State
and Local Governments1
A verage,
50 S tate s

F u nction
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Although the Rocky Mountain states as a whole
experienced a significant average annual gain in
per capita income from 1969 to 1979, Montana
continues to rank at the lower end of the national
income scale. According to information released
recently by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Montana ranked
thirty-eighth among the fifty states in per capita
personal income in 1979, with a figure of $7,400.
Alaska ranked first, with per capita income of over

$11,000.

Table 3

T o ta l d ir e c t e x p e n d itu re s
E d u c a tio n , t o t a l
Local s cho ols
I n s t it u t io n s o f
h ig h e r e d u ca tio n
O ther e d u c a tio n
T ra n s p o rta tio n
Highways
P u b lic w e lfa r e
H e a lth and h o s p ita ls
N a tu ra l re s o u rc e s , parks
Governmental a d m in is tra tio n
In te r e s t on de bt

Montanans’ Per Capita Income

The measure used is ''personal income." This
consists of wages, salaries and the income of the
self-employed, plus dividends, interest, and rent
income. Social security, welfare and other transfer
payments are also included.
The ten poorest states in per capita income in
1979 were Mississippi (lowest, at just over $6,000),
Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, Maine, Utah,
Vermont, New Mexico, Tennessee, and South
Dakota. The top ten states were Alaska, Nevada,
Connecticut, California, Illinois, New Jersey,
Wyoming, Delaware, Washington, and Hawaii.
From 1969 to 1979, the southwestern and Rocky
Mountain states showed a faster income growth
than the other areas of the country. However, until
the 1970s, per capita income in the western states
tended to lag behind that of the eastern states. So,
despite the high rate of increase in the past ten
years, the 1979 average annual per capita income in
the Rocky Mountain states of $8,200 still ranked
below the $8,700 national average. Montana's
figure of $7,400 was significantly below the national
average.
Economists' Notebook

Table 4

1970-1979 Population Change

Population, Rocky Mountain States1

States of the northern Rocky Mountain region
showed a substantial gain in population since 1970,
according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates.
However, within the region, Montana's gain was
the lowest (table 4).
Using 1970 Census figures, and the Census
Bureau's 1979 provisional estimates, population in
the northern Rocky Mountain states increased
from 5,008,000 to 6,280,000, a total gain of 25
percent. Wyoming showed the largest increase, 36
percent, followed by Utah's gain of 29 percent,
Idaho's increase of 27 percent, and Colorado's
increase of 25 percent. Montana ranked last in the
region, with a population increase of 13 percent.
The U.S. population as a whole increased 8
percent during these years. Of the 21 states located
in the Midwest and New England, only one. New
Hampshire, showed a percentage population gain
greater than Montana's. Nationally, the greatest
gains were recorded in the Sun Belt states. Highest
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in the U.S. was Nevada's gain of 43 percent.
Population declined in New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C.
□
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M O N T A N A ’S FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY:
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
by

Charles E. Keegan III
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GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF MODERN-DAY MONTANA
MARY L. LENIHAN

o n January 21 this year, the price of gold on the

international market peaked at $875 per ounce.
While the price has since declined, the recent
activity in the gold market reminds us of that
metal's continuing importance. Montanans are
reminded, too, that gold provided the catalyst for
the emergence of modern-day Montana.
In 1848, when gold was discovered in California,
gold fever became an American epidemic. From
California, miners filtered eastward to Colorado
and Nevada and north to Oregon and Washington.
Montana, remote and rugged, remained un
investigated. Fur trappers had operated in the area,
and a few white settlements existed. But by as late as
1863, still an unorganized territory, Montana had a
white population of only about 670 persons, mostly
men.
22

By October 1864, however, the yellow metal had
performed its magic. In the first election held in the
newly created Montana Territory, 6,866 votes were
cast. Presuming those votes were cast by white
males, in one year that segment of the population
had increased by an amazing 1,000 percent. The
reason? Gold.
The first gold discovery officially recorded in
Montana was made in 1858. A party of miners.
Midwest-bound after disappointing diggings in the
California gold fields, found gold in a creek near
present-day Drummond. The creek was named,
naturally. Gold Creek. But this early discovery did
not precipitate a rush. No “ mother lode" was
discovered at that, the first of many “ Gold Creeks"
to be so named in Montana.
In 1862, a minor gold rush occurred when a

premiere tourist attractions, these cities were little
more than rough camps at first; with increased
wealth, however, came sophistication. Frame
buildings were constructed, trade routes
materialized, merchants arrived, and soon
churches, schools, bars, bawdy houses, literary
societies, libraries, and the other attendant signs of
civilization appeared. Though these cities were
eventually abandoned (their mines produced $40
million in gold by 1868), their creation was the
foundation of permanent white settlement in the
state.
A second major Montana gold strike was
uncovered in 1864. A party known as the “ Four
Georgians" (though only one, it seems, was actually
from Georgia) left Virginia City to investigate
reports of gold in the Kootenai River country. After
traveling as far west as Hellgate Canyon, near
Missoula, and turning back upon hearing dis
couraging reports, they headed for the Prickly Pear
Valley. They found gold, moved north to find more,
and, finding none, returned to try their first strike at
Prickly Pear once more. It was, they figured, their
“ last chance."
This strike proved to be enormous. Returning to
Virginia City for supplies, the group was followed

successful placer operation was begun at
Grasshopper Creek, a tributary of the Beaverhead
River. Bannack, Montana's first gold boom town,
was the result. But the real rush was yet to come.
An early pioneer, Robert Vaughan, wrote that
“ there is no animal on earth that will stampede
quicker, keep on going with the same stubbornness
and determination, as a fortune hunter; they are
worse than Texas cattle." And so it was in the spring
of 1863, when a prospecting party from Bannack
discovered gold at Alder Gluch, near the Madison
Valley.
By 1865, more than 10,000 whites (and some
Chinese and blacks) had crowded into the
area. These fortune hunters came from all parts of
the country. A sizable number had tried mining first
in the other western states. Others arrived directly
from the Midwest, East, and South. The nation was
in the midst of the Civil War, and many young men
preferred the uncertainties of the gold fields to that
of the battlefields. Myths still abound in Montana
concerning the supposed influx of Confederate
deserters to Montana's gold fields.
Regardless of their background, the miners
crowded into settlements such as Virginia City and
Nevada City. Now preserved, and two of the state's
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back to the Prickly Pear by the usual horde of
hopeful gold seekers. Nicknamed “ Last Chance
Gulch/' the strike and its surrounding camp
mushroomed into the city of Helena. Gold strikes in
that area eventually produced nearly $20 million.
After Helena, Confederate Gulch and Diamond
City boomed, beginning in 1865. These mines
produced another $10 million in gold. By 1866, gold
production in Montana ranked second only to
California's. Prospectors found additional claims in
an area stretching from the upper reaches of the
Yellowstone River to the Clark Fork. Altogether,
Montana's mines had produced a total of $92
million in gold by 1868.
Placer mines quickly exhausted the surface
deposits, and by the end of the 1860s hydraulic
mining and other more technologically advanced
methods were in use. Gold deposits often lie in
proximity to silver and copper; by the 1870s the
gold furor had dissipated somewhat and silver and
copper mining began in earnest. But it was the
initial search for gold which launched Montana
into its first industrial age.

24

,

,

,

,

,

Montana's history is filled with stories from the
gold years. Some of the more interesting describe
the Chinese, who panned their washwater after
laundering the miners' clothes; the stock boys in
the general stores, who sifted the contents of their
dustpans at day's end; and the successful miners
who could not ride to a neighboring valley without
causing a minor exodus of those sure that a new
strike had been uncovered. Mostly, Montana's
gold fields attracted hard working people who took
enormous risks to seek riches. A few succeeded,
but many more did not. Of these, some departed to
seek their fortune elsewhere. But many stayed, and
became the ranchers, farmers, loggers,
shopkeepers and financiers who ushered Montana
into the twentieth century.
□
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